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a b s t r a c t
This study conducts experiments to determine the modes of communication that are able to
produce and sustain collusion and how the efﬁcacy of communication depends on market
structure. Two communication treatments are considered: non-binding price announcements and unrestricted written communication. We ﬁnd that price announcements are
conducive to coordinating on a high price but only under duopoly and when ﬁrms are symmetric. The standard experimental ﬁnding that collusion without communication is rare
when there are more than two ﬁrms is shown to be robust to allowing ﬁrms to make price
announcements. When ﬁrms are asymmetric, price announcements do result in higher
prices but there is little evidence that ﬁrms are coordinating their behavior. When ﬁrms
are allowed to engage in unrestricted written communication, coordination on high prices
occurs for all market structures. We ﬁnd that the incremental value to express communication (compared to price announcements) is greater when ﬁrms are asymmetric and there
are more ﬁrms.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Introduction
For ﬁrms to successfully collude, they must coordinate their behavior, and coordination requires some form of communication. In practice, this communication can involve tacking on a few digits to a multi-million dollar bid as in the FCC spectrum
auction (Cramton and Schwartz, 2000) or announcing future intended prices as in the market for air travel (Borenstein, 2004)
or unilaterally announcing a pricing strategy as in the truck rental market1 or sitting in a hotel room and talking about prices
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and sales quotas as in the lysine market (Eichenwald, 2000). While the last mode of communication is presumably the most
effective, it is also the most clearly unlawful. Firms interested in jointly raising prices face a tension in that communication
which is more likely to result in coordination may also be more likely to result in prosecution. Hence, they may choose to
more indirectly communicate when it is sufﬁcient to produce at least some collusion.
This trade-off raises two questions that we examine here. First, what are the various forms of communication that can
produce coordinated collusive outcomes? In particular, how indirect can communication be and still be reasonably effective?
This question is central to antitrust and competition law and, in spite of a legion of legal cases that speak to what practices
are and are not lawful, there remains a large gray area where legality is unclear.2 Second, how does the answer to the ﬁrst
question depend on the structure of the market?
These questions are notoriously difﬁcult to examine theoretically because the equilibrium framework cannot speak to the
issue of how ﬁrms coordinate in moving from one equilibrium to another which is exactly what is at issue here: What forms
of communication will result in ﬁrms coordinating a move from a static equilibrium with competitive prices to a dynamic
equilibrium with supracompetitive prices? Experimental methods offer a comparative advantage in that subjects engage in
exactly the dynamic process of coordination that we are trying to understand. While the subjects are college students and
not managers – and thus extrapolating from experiments to market behavior is always a precarious leap – experimental
methods have more promise than other methods for shedding light on the effectiveness of various communication practices
in producing collusion.
The speciﬁc form of those two questions are addressed here as follows. In practice, two commonly observed methods of
communication for coordinating ﬁrm behavior are advance price announcements (as arose in the ATPCO airlines cases) and
unrestricted communication using natural language (as practiced by hard core cartels; for example, lysine, vitamins, and ﬁne
arts auction houses).3 To assess the relative efﬁcacy of different modes of communication, the research plan is to compare
outcomes when sellers can make price announcements with when they cannot, and to compare unrestricted communication
(through online chat) with price announcements. When are price announcements effective at producing collusion? When
is unrestricted communication particularly effective in producing collusion relative to price announcements? Answers to
these questions will shed light on when we can expect ﬁrms to engage in the most egregious form of collusion – involving
unrestricted communication – and when they will instead choose less express methods. In considering the relative efﬁcacy
of these different forms of communication, market structure is varied in terms of the extent of ﬁrm heterogeneity and the
number of sellers. While unrestricted communication is surely expected to be more effective than price announcements,
less clear is how the incremental value of unrestricted communication depends on market structure.
Our main ﬁndings are that ﬁrms are able to coordinate on a high price with price announcements but only for duopoly
and when ﬁrms are symmetric. When there are more than two ﬁrms, it is a widely-documented experimental ﬁnding that
collusion is rare without communication and we ﬁnd that result robust to allowing ﬁrms to make price announcements.
While price announcements do result in higher prices for an asymmetric duopoly, there is little evidence that they are
coordinating their behavior in the sense of acting consistent with a collusive equilibrium. When ﬁrms engage in unrestricted
communication, coordination on high prices occurs whether ﬁrms are symmetric or asymmetric and regardless of the
number of ﬁrms.
Section 2 provides a brief summary of experimental work pertinent to the current study. Section 3 describes the experimental design as well as the theoretical model underlying the experiment. The results from the experiments are described
and discussed in Section 4.
2. Literature review
Pertinent to this paper are past studies that experimentally examine how the frequency and extent of supracompetitive
outcomes depend on: (1) the method of communication between ﬁrms about price or quantity intentions; and (2) ﬁrm
heterogeneity. There is a voluminous literature addressing the ﬁrst issue, while the set of experiments addressing the second
issue is relatively sparse. There are no experiments that address the interaction of communication and ﬁrm heterogeneity,
which is the primary focus of the current study. We provide here a brief summary of results from previous experiments,
and an extensive review is available in our working paper (Harrington et al., 2013). Previous surveys of the experimental
literature on communication of intentions in an oligopoly include Cason (2008), Normann (2008), Haan et al. (2009), and
Potters (2009).
The communication protocols used in past oligopoly experiments can be partitioned into four categories. In all of these
cases, the announcements made by subjects are non-binding. A Simple Price Announcement protocol involves one or more
subjects announcing a price and, in some experiments, subjects responding to an announcement by afﬁrming or rejecting it.
An Iterative Price Announcement protocol has multiple stages where price announcements made in an earlier stage restrict
the announcements that can be made in the current stage. A Strategy Announcement protocol has subjects announce not a
price but a strategy for the game or, more generally, some set of contingency plans. Finally, a Chat protocol allows for either

2
3

Kaplow (2013) delivers an excellent discussion of the boundaries of unlawful collusion.
The ATPCO case is covered in Borenstein (2004), while many hard core cartels are discussed in Harrington (2006) and Marshall and Marx (2012).
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oral or written communication using natural language with minimal restrictions though typically prohibiting a subject from
revealing his or her identity.
The following results are distilled from the experimental literature using those communication protocols (and when no
communication is allowed). We have noted papers that tested for the hypothesized behavior though not every paper ﬁnds
evidence supportive of the noted regularity.
1. Without communication, prices above static Nash equilibrium levels commonly occur when there are two sellers but
very rarely occur with more than two sellers (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Huck et al., 2004; Engel, 2007; Rojas, 2012;
Friedman et al., 2015).
2. Compared to prices when sellers do not communicate, allowing sellers to announce prices results in initially higher prices
but then prices decline to levels mildly above or close to levels when communication is prohibited (Holt and Davis, 1990;
Cason, 1995; Cason and Davis, 1995; Harstad et al., 1998; Hinloopen and Soetevent, 2008; Bigoni et al., 2012; Cooper and
Kühn, 2014).
3. Making communication costly tends to raise price. (Andersson and Wengström (2007) and Andersson and Holm (2013)
assume a cost per message, while Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) and Bigoni et al. (2012) assume probabilistic penalties
from all ﬁrms agreeing to communicate.)
4. Compared to prices when sellers do not communicate, chat produces signiﬁcantly higher prices which persist over time
(Friedman, 1967; Issac and Plott, 1981; Issac et al., 1984; Davis and Holt, 1998; Dijkstra et al., 2011; Fonseca and Normann,
2012; Cooper and Kühn, 2014).
5. Compared to when ﬁrms are symmetric, asymmetric costs result in lower prices (Mason et al., 1992; Mason and Phillips,
1997; Fonseca and Normann, 2008; Dugar and Mitra, 2009; Argenton and Müller, 2012).
Pertinent to the current study, the literature has not addressed the following questions:
• What is the effect of ﬁrm heterogeneity on the efﬁcacy of communication?
• What is the effect of ﬁrm heterogeneity and the number of ﬁrms on the efﬁcacy of unrestricted communication compared
to price announcements?
• Do price announcements allow ﬁrms (whether symmetric or asymmetric) to effectively collude when there are more than
two ﬁrms?
3. Experimental design
The experimental setting is a variant of the Bertrand price game in which sellers make posted offers, have homogeneous
products, and may have different cost functions. In each period, a seller chooses a price and an upper bound on how much
it is willing to produce and sell (this choice variable will allow sellers to allocate demand). The horizon is indeﬁnite and
the history is common knowledge. Section 3.1 provides a detailed description of the setting. A summary of the equilibrium
properties for the game are provided in Section 3.2. The various treatments are described in Section 3.3, and the procedures
deployed in conducting the experiments are summarized in Section 3.4.
3.1. Environment
Sellers offer identical products and face market demand D(P) = 150 − P with 150 computerized buyers.4 The experiment
consists of a multi-period posted-offer market with n participants playing the role of sellers. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are randomly matched in groups of n people and the match is kept ﬁxed throughout the session. Subjects are
told that a session will last for at least 40 periods after which there is an 80% chance in each period of the session continuing
to the subsequent period.5
Each seller’s cost function is a step-function with the low cost step equaling 10 and the high cost step equaling 54. Seller
i is assigned kiL low cost units and kiH high cost units so the cost function is



Ci (q) =

10q



10kiL + 54 q − kiL



if q ∈
if q ∈




0, 1, . . ., kiL



kiL + 1, . . ., kiL + kiH



In all treatments, industry capacity is ﬁxed at 24 units of low cost capacity and 180 units of high cost capacity, while the
allocation of those units across sellers varies across treatments (and will be described later). Thus, market demand and the
industry cost curve are as depicted in Fig. 1.
In each period, subjects simultaneously choose a price and a maximal quantity (to be sold). A subject’s total number of
units produced and sold equals the minimum of its demand and the maximal quantity it selected. Subjects are told that low

4
5

There is one buyer with a valuation of 150, one with a valuation of 149, and so forth.
The shortest session ran for 40 periods while the longest one lasted for 53 periods.
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Fig. 1. Industry cost and demand.

cost units will be sold ﬁrst, and any excess demand will not be carried over to the next period. Sellers only incur costs for the
units sold. Subjects have 60 s to select a price and a maximal quantity, and there is only one price-maximal quantity offer
posted by a subject in each period. If a subject chose not to post an offer then he/she earns zero proﬁts for that period.6 Once
subjects post their price-maximal quantity offers, the market clears. Buyers ﬁrst purchase from the low price seller until
demand or the low price seller’s maximal quantity is reached. If there is any residual demand, the process is repeated for
the next lowest price seller and this process continues until all demand is met at the prevailing prices or maximal quantities
are achieved. Buyers only purchase units if the price is equal to or below their valuation for those units. In case of a tie, the
system alternates between sellers – buying a single unit from each seller (with identical prices) – until all available units are
exhausted. Subjects are informed about the tie-breaking rule and that the buyers are computerized.
At the end of a period, each subject learns the price-maximal quantity offers of all subjects in their group as well as all
subjects’ results in terms of units sold and proﬁt earned. They can also review the entire history at any point in time. The
environment that subjects face is common knowledge; in particular, they all know market demand, the number of sellers,
and each seller’s cost function. Subjects are provided with a proﬁt calculator where they can input price-maximal quantity
offers for all sellers and learn the resulting proﬁts. They are told: “The proﬁt calculator allows you to estimate your (and
others’) proﬁts. To do so you can input your price and quantity and make guesses for the other sellers.”
The asymmetric treatment involves two ﬁrms. One subject is randomly selected to be ﬁrm 1 which is given more units
of low cost capacity than the other subject playing ﬁrm 2, and these roles are kept ﬁxed throughout a session. For all ﬁrms,
the amount of low cost capacity is set sufﬁciently low so that each ﬁrm’s capacity is used up at the static Nash equilibria and
at the joint proﬁt maximum. As shown below, this speciﬁcation has two implications. First, ﬁrms have the same ordering
over a common price and, in particular, agree that the best common price is 102. Second, the static Nash equilibria are the
same in both the symmetric and asymmetric treatments.
As the two-step marginal cost function departs from the standard speciﬁcation, let us conclude by highlighting several
appealing properties of it. First, under the more common assumption of constant marginal cost, Nash equilibrium involves
weakly dominated strategies when ﬁrms are symmetric which can cause unstable behavior. With the two-step marginal
cost function, Nash equilibrium is not in weakly dominated strategies and ﬁrms earn positive proﬁts. Second, under the
assumption of constant marginal cost (with a ﬁnite price set), there are many Nash equilibria and this indeterminacy could
confound the analysis when we compare results for symmetric and asymmetric cost functions. Third, by assuming that the
cost asymmetry applies only to a small number of units, the set of static Nash equilibria with the two-step marginal cost
function are identical for symmetric and asymmetric treatments, but collusive equilibria can differ (as we show in the next
section). Thus, ﬁrm asymmetries are relevant only when ﬁrms try to collude, which is the focus of this study.7
3.2. Theory
In the static game, a pure strategy is of the form (p, r) where p is a ﬁrm’s price and r is a ﬁrm’s maximal quantity.
In characterizing equilibria for the static game, we will allow for mixed strategies. Let ri (p) denote the maximal quantity
associated with ﬁrm i choosing price p (whether as part of a pure or mixed strategy). Note that when p > 54 (which, recall, is
the cost of high cost capacity units), ri (p) is part of an optimal strategy as long as it is as least as large as residual demand. In

6

A seller posted an offer more than 98% of the time.
Some readers have expressed concern that the experimental setting may be too complex because, in contrast to the usual modeling of Bertrand price
competition, marginal cost is a step function and subjects choose a maximal quantity as well as price. In a footnote at the beginning of Section 4.3, we note
that experimental output is consistent with subjects understanding the market setting as reﬂected in proﬁt-maximizing behavior.
7
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addition, setting the maximal quantity at least as large as market demand D(p) weakly dominates setting it below market
demand. We will focus on Nash equilibria in which ri (p) ≥ D(p) when p ≥ 54.
The following proposition holds for the parametric assumptions in the experiment.8
Proposition 1. Consider a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which ri (p) ≥ D(p)∀p ≥ 54 in the support of ﬁrm i’s strategy, ∀i.
Each ﬁrm’s strategy assigns probability one to prices in {54, 55}.
The set of Nash equilibria underlying Proposition 1 is composed of all ﬁrms pricing at 54, all ﬁrms pricing at 55, and ﬁrms
randomizing over 54 and 55. Thus, the “competitive price” is 54–55.
Turning to the indeﬁnite horizon repeated game, there are obviously many subgame perfect equilibria. To gain some
insight, suppose sellers settle on the Nash Bargaining Solution when the choice set is composed of all stationary outcome
paths implementable using the grim punishment.9 Let us further limit our attention to ﬁrms choosing a common price but
possibly setting maximal quantities in order to unequally allocate market demand. In this case, it can be shown that ﬁrm
heterogeneity does not matter in that the resulting outcome is symmetric.
Proposition 2. The Nash Bargaining Solution for the set of outcomes sustainable by grim subgame perfect equilibria is symmetric.
While ﬁrms’ traits then need not affect collusive behavior, this was shown for just one possible speciﬁcation of collusion.
If an equilibrium has all ﬁrms producing at least as much as its low cost capacity (for all histories) then the equilibrium
conditions are independent of the amount of low cost capacity. However, consider a strategy proﬁle in which the punishment
has the deviator sell zero for some number of periods and, after doing so, there is a return to the collusive outcome. Now
equilibrium conditions depend on a ﬁrm’s low cost capacity because a ﬁrm with more low cost capacity foregoes more proﬁt
when it produces zero. By affecting the set of equilibrium outcomes from which the cartel selects, ﬁrms’ traits may then
result in an asymmetric outcome.
To pursue this latter point, consider the following strategy proﬁle where the collusive outcome has all ﬁrms set a common
price and ﬁrm i’s share of market demand is si . If a ﬁrm deviates from the outcome path, suppose that the punishment has
the deviator choose (p, r) = (55, D(55)) and the non-deviators choose (p, r) = (54, D(54)) for one period – so the deviator sells
zero and the non-deviators share market demand at a price of 54 – and then there is a return to the collusive outcome.
This punishment applies whether a ﬁrm deviates from the original collusive path or the punishment path. Considering this
strategy proﬁle at the joint proﬁt maximizing price of 102 and assuming capacities for the asymmetric duopoly treatment
– (k1L , k2L ) = (18, 6) – it can be shown that all equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed if and only if s1 ≥ .403 and s2 ≥ .504. Thus,
a higher market share for the high cost ﬁrm may be required in order to sustain collusion.
Though our analysis of dynamic equilibria is limited, there are two useful takeaways. First, there is a wide class of scenarios
whereby the collusive outcome is symmetric even when ﬁrms have different cost functions. If ﬁrms focus on equilibria in
which they always produce at least as much as their low cost capacity (such as with symmetric equilibria constructed on
the grim punishment) and the selection of an outcome does not depend on relative proﬁts then the prediction is that the
collusive outcome will involve equal market shares. Second, scenarios have been identiﬁed whereby the collusive outcome
has the ﬁrm with fewer units of low cost capacity assigned a higher market share. If the punishment used in equilibrium has
the deviator produce zero (for some length of time), it is the higher cost ﬁrm’s equilibrium condition that is most stringent
which means it will need to have more market share.
3.3. Treatments
There are three treatment variables: number of ﬁrms, seller cost heterogeneity, and communication. The number of ﬁrms
varied between 2, 3, and 4. In the symmetric treatment, all sellers have the same number of low cost and high cost units.
The asymmetric treatment – which was run only for the case of a duopoly – assumes that both ﬁrms have total capacity
of 102 units with ﬁrm 1 having 18 units of low cost capacity and ﬁrm 2 having 6 units of low cost capacity. The various
treatments with regards to the number of ﬁrms and cost conditions is shown in the bottom row of Table 1. Finally, there are
three communication treatments:
• No Communication: Sellers cannot communicate in any form with their rivals. Sellers simultaneously choose pricemaximal quantity offers and have a maximum of 60 s to make a decision. If offers are made earlier, the system immediately
determines the market outcome and informs sellers of the outcome. Sellers also have the option of not posting an offer by
clicking on the “Do not send an offer” button. Sellers have access to the entire history.
• Price Announcement: Sellers are informed that each period of the session consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage (price
announcement), sellers simultaneously choose (or not) to make a single non-binding price announcement regarding the
price they will select in the market competition stage. Thus, communication between sellers is exclusively numeric and no
additional information can be transmitted. Price announcements are simultaneously released to the other sellers. All sellers

8

All results in this section are proven and discussed more extensively in Harrington et al. (2013) and are available in the Online Appendix.
This speciﬁcation was used in Harrington (1991) for the duopoly case when k1L = 0 and k2L = ∞ (that is, constant marginal cost that differs between
ﬁrms). Also see Miklós-Thal (2011) where optimal punishments are considered.
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Table 1
Experimental treatments.
Communication protocol

No communication
Price announcements
Chat



Cost treatments kiL , kiH



Symmetric

Asymmetric

n=2

n=3

SNC2 [12]
SAN2 [12]
SCH2 [12]

SNC3 [8]
SAN3 [8]

(12, 90)

(8, 60)

n=4

n=2

SAN4 [6]
SCH4 [6]

ANC2 [13]
AAN2 [12]
ACH2 [12]

(6, 45)

(18, 84), (6, 96)

know that all price announcements are non-binding, and that they can choose not to make an announcement.10 While the
ﬁrst stage can last for up to 60 s, it immediately goes to the second stage if all announcements are made before the time
limit. As in the No Communication treatment, the second stage has them simultaneously make price-maximal quantity
offers. All information is common and sellers have access to the entire history, including all sellers’ announcements.
• Chat: Sellers are informed that each period of the session consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, they can participate in
an online chat room where they communicate with the other seller(s) for 60 s. The communication protocol is explicitly
explained to the participants: “You are free to discuss any aspects of the experiment, with the following exceptions: you
may not reveal your name, discuss side payments outside the laboratory, or engage in inappropriate language (including
such shorthand as ‘WTF’). If you do, you will be excused and you will not be paid.” As in the No Communication treatment,
the second stage has them simultaneously make price-maximal quantity offers. Sellers have access to the entire history,
including all sellers’ messages.
The No Communication treatment describes the usual environment in which ﬁrms can only coordinate by signaling
through their actual transaction prices. The Price Announcement treatment captures a feature of some markets in which
ﬁrms can make non-binding announcements about future prices. For example, advance price announcements have been
deployed and argued to have produced supracompetitive prices in steel (Scherer, 1980), airlines (Borenstein, 2004), and
diesel and petrol fuel in Taiwan (Fair Trade Commission Decision, 2004).11 The Price Announcement treatment is designed
to give ﬁrms an instrument by which to coordinate that is short of express communication. The issue is whether price
announcements are sufﬁciently informative to induce coordinated behavior.12 Finally, the Chat treatment models explicit
collusion in that ﬁrms can engage in unrestricted communication in order to coordinate on a collusive outcome and engage
in an exchange of assurances.
Table 1 summarizes the different combination of treatments used in the experiment along with the notation we will
use when referring to the treatment. In brackets [ ] is the number of sessions run with that treatment. Given the large
number of possible combinations, the number of sellers-ﬁrm heterogeneity treatments were chosen to make the best use
of our budget by avoiding treatments that were unlikely to provide new information. For example, if n ﬁrms for a treatment
yielded competitive results then we did not run the treatment with more than n ﬁrms as it is likely to produce competitive
results.
3.4. Procedures
Our subject pool consisted of students from Chapman University which is a major American university with a diverse
population. Participants were recruited by email from a pool of more than 2000 students who had signed up to participate
in experiments. Emails were sent to a randomly selected subset of the pool of students. Subjects were recruited for a total
of two hours. The experiments took place in May 2011. In total, 242 students participated in 73 duopoly, 16 triopoly and 12
quadropoly experiments.
The instructions were displayed on subjects’ computer screens and they were told that all screens displayed the same
set of instructions. They had exactly 20 min to read the instructions (which are provided in theOnline Appendix). A 20-min
timer was shown on the laboratory screen. Three minutes before the end of the instructions period, a monitor entered
the room announcing the time remaining and handing out a printed copy of the summary of the instructions. None of the
participants asked for extra time to read the instructions. At the end of the 20-min instruction round, the experimenter
closed the instructions ﬁle from the server, and subjects typed their names to start the session. The interaction between the
experimenter and the participants was negligible.

10

A seller can either click the button “Do not send an announcement” or not submit an announcement and wait until the end of the announcement period.
In our experiment, price announcements can only affect seller behavior because buyers are simulated and, even if buyers were live, they would be
irrelevant to buyer behavior. It is then best to think of the Price Announcement treatment as relevant to markets in which these announcements are not
received by buyers (for example, they occur through a trade association) or where such information is of little value to buyers.
12
We intentionally did not allow ﬁrms to also announce maximal quantities because such quantity announcements are very uncommon though have
occurred in the automobile industry (Doyle and Snyder, 1999).
11
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Table 2
Average market price. Average (median) [Std. Dev] market price.
No communication

Price Announcements

Chat

Periods

SNC2

ANC2

SNC3

SAN2

AAN2

SAN3

SAN4

SCH2

ACH2

SCH4

1–40

66.7
(63.4)
[11.8]

61.5
(57.8)
[10.9]

58.5
(56.8)
[8.1]

76.2
(72.6)
[17.6]

67.5
(65.7)
[5.9]

58.0
(55.7)
[4.6]

61.2
(61.0)
[7.4]

91.2
(92.7)
[12.5]

91.2
(90.4)
[17.6]

89.6
(94.7)
[17.1]

1–20

64.0
(61.3)
[11.7]

60.0
(56.6)
[12.4]

60.7
(56.0)
[15.9]

72.9
(64.5)
[18.1]

64.4
(64.3)
[7.3]

58.3
(56.1)
[5.3]

63.2
(63.9)
[8.8]

83.5
(83.8)
[18.4]

82.7
(83.5)
[20.2]

85.7
(87.2)
[16.8]

21–40

69.5
(64.1)
[17.1]

63.0
(56.9)
[14.3]

56.3
(55.6)
[2.2]

79.5
(76.5)
[20.2]

70.6
(72.8)
[9.4]

57.7
(55.8)
[4.3]

59.2
(55.5)
[7.9]

98.9
(102.0)
[8.6]

99.5
(99.8)
[17.2]

93.4
(102.0)
[18.5]

The show-up fee was $7.00 and average payoffs (including the show-up fee) varied from a low of $18.85 (which was for
triopoly with the No Communication treatment) to a high of $34.35 (which was for duopoly with the Chat treatment).
4. Results
Our interest is understanding the conditions under which subjects settle down on a collusive equilibrium. When collusion
does emerge, we do not generally expect it to occur immediately for a subject may go through a learning phase as she seeks to
become better informed about the market environment and other subjects’ strategies. For this reason, results are reported for
periods 1–20, 21–40, and 1–40.13 We expect results for periods 21–40 to be most informative and, in fact, there is evidence
of learning in the early periods as revealed both through choices and in the messages from the Chat treatment.
4.1. Baseline: no communication
Let us begin by considering the benchmark protocol of No Communication (NC). Table 2 reports the mean, median, and
standard deviation of average market price.14 We test whether market prices are equal to (or exceed) the competitive price
using a non-parametric test in light of the small number of observations and that market price is not normally distributed.15
Mean and median market price exceed 55 in all treatments so it is at least as high as the static Nash equilibrium price
of 54–55. Average market price is signiﬁcantly higher for symmetric duopoly with a price of 69.5 (p-value = .003) and for
asymmetry duopoly with a price of 63.0 (p-value = .011). In contrast, the average market price for symmetric triopoly is 56.3
which is very close to the competitive price (p-value = .363).
Consistent with previous ﬁndings in the experimental literature, supracompetitive prices occur with two sellers but not
with three sellers. We also ﬁnd for the case of a duopoly that prices are higher when ﬁrms’ cost functions are identical
though it is only barely statistically signiﬁcant. For periods 1–40, prices are higher under symmetry by 8.5% (p-value = .103;
see Table 4), and are higher for periods 21–40 by 10.3% (p-value = .128).
Result 1. For the case of no communication, average market price exceeds the competitive level in duopoly (symmetric
and asymmetric) but not in triopoly (symmetric). For the case of duopoly and no communication, average market price is
higher when ﬁrms have identical cost functions than when they have different cost functions (though the difference is not
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels).
4.2. Signaling: price announcements
In assessing the effect of the communication protocol on behavior and how its effect depends on market structure, it
is important to note that collusion is more than high prices; it is a mutual understanding among ﬁrms to coordinate their
behavior which is formally expressed as a collusive equilibrium for an indeﬁnite horizon game. Prices could be high and
yet ﬁrms may not be colluding. For example, ﬁrms may periodically raise price in order to attempt to coordinate a move
to a collusive equilibrium but never succeed in doing so; high average prices are then the product of failed attempts to
collude. Or sellers may engage in randomized pricing that periodically results in high prices – thus producing high average
prices – but again there is not the regularity in prices one would typically associate with a collusive equilibrium. In the

13
Recall that the length of the horizon is 40 periods for sure and is then stochastically terminated. There was no evidence of end-game effects before or
after period 40.
14
The market price is the sum of ﬁrms’ prices weighted by the ﬁrm’s market shares, and the average market price for a group is the market price averaged
across all periods (and is the unit of observation for calculating the statistics in Table 2).
15
The histograms on market price are available in the Online Appendix. A one-sided sign test is used for which the null hypothesis is median market
price = 55 and the alternative hypothesis is median market price >55. Given that theory predicts that price will not be less than the static Nash equilibrium
price but could exceed it, a one-sided test seems appropriate.
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Table 3
Coordination measures (duopoly).
No communication

Price announcements

Chat

Periods

SNC2

ANC2

SAN2

AAN2

SCH2

ACH2

Number of periods
with equal price
(p > 55)

1–40
1–20
21–40

5.3
1.8
3.5

4.0
2.2
1.8

13.0
4.0
9.0

4.3
1.4
2.9

29.5
11.2
18.3

17.7
6.7
11.0

Duration of price
coordination (p > 55)

1–40
1–20
21–40

2.5
1.0
2.3

1.7
1.3
1.2

9.8
2.7
7.8

1.8
0.8
1.5

23.0
8.5
17.3

11.8
5.2
8.7

ensuing analysis, sellers will be said to be colluding when prices are high and follow some stable pattern. This could mean
consistently setting identical prices and equally sharing demand. Or ﬁrms could consistently set different prices with the
ﬁrm with the lower (but still high) price restricting its supply so that the ﬁrm with the higher price has residual demand.
Or ﬁrms could alternate over time with one ﬁrm selling to the market and the other ﬁrm pricing itself out of the market or
not participating. Recognizing the different forms that supracompetitive outcomes can take, various measures will be used
in our analysis.
As an initial step, let us focus on collusion that takes the form of ﬁrms setting identical supracompetitive prices. To identify
the extent to which price announcements results in such an outcome, we will report average market price and two measures
of coordination: the number of periods for which sellers set the same price exceeding the competitive price (Same) and the
longest number of consecutive periods for which sellers set identical prices (Duration). Sellers achieving a high average price
and high measures of Same and Duration is compelling evidence that they are colluding. If sellers achieve a high average
price and low measures of coordination then it could either be that ﬁrms are not colluding or are colluding in a different
manner.
In going from the No Communication to the Price Announcement treatment, Table 2 reports that the average market price
under duopoly substantially increases, whether ﬁrms are symmetric or asymmetric. Using a Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test
(see Table 4), this difference is statistically signiﬁcant for asymmetric duopolies (e.g., p-value = .004 for periods 1–40) but
only marginally so for symmetric duopolies (e.g., p-value = .133 for periods 1–40). Though the increase in average price is
actually larger in absolute and percentage terms when ﬁrms are symmetric, the standard deviation is much larger. We will
return to this point later.
Having the ability to make price announcements proves insufﬁcient to produce collusion when there are more than two
ﬁrms. For symmetric triopolies, average price is 57.7 (periods 21–40) which is close to average price without announcements
(56.3) and to the competitive price (54–55). Similar results were found in six sessions conducted with four symmetric ﬁrms.
In sum, price announcements matter when there are two sellers – whether symmetric or asymmetric – but not when there
are more than two sellers.
One of the most robust ﬁndings in the experimental literature on collusion is that, in the absence of communication, three
or more ﬁrms very rarely collude. Our results show this result to be robust to allowing communication to occur through
price announcements. There is a fundamental difference in the strategic uncertainty faced by two ﬁrms and by more than
two ﬁrms. With a duopoly, a ﬁrm that announces a high price need only convince the other ﬁrm that it intends to set a
high price in order to induce that rival ﬁrm to also set a high price. But that is insufﬁcient when there are three ﬁrms. The
announcement of a high price by ﬁrm 1 may convince ﬁrms 2 and 3 that ﬁrm 1 intends to raise price but ﬁrm 2 may be
uncertain as to whether ﬁrm 3 drew the same inference and thus uncertain as to whether ﬁrm 3 will raise price. Our results
suggest that price announcements are inadequate for surmounting the challenge of higher order beliefs necessary to achieve
collusion when there are more than two ﬁrms.
While price announcements are producing higher average prices for duopolies, have ﬁrms coordinated on a stable pattern
of prices? Examining the coordination measures in Table 3, there is more than a doubling in the number of periods in which
ﬁrms in a symmetric duopoly set identical prices, as it increases from 5.3 to 13.0. It is even more impressive if we focus on
periods 21–40 where the frequency of identical prices rises from 18% of the time to almost 45%. Furthermore, this higher
frequency of equal prices is time-dependent: Probit regressions show that the probability that ﬁrms’ prices are identical in
the current period is higher when they were identical in the previous period.16 The Duration measure tells the same story,
as the average maximal number of consecutive periods for which ﬁrms set the same price goes from 2–3 to 7–8 periods.
In contrast, price announcements do not produce any increase in the coordination measures when ﬁrms are asymmetric.
Though the differences for symmetric ﬁrms are not statistically signiﬁcant by the usual standards (see Table 4), the evidence
is suggestive that price announcements are producing more coordination for symmetric duopolies.

16
A series of probit regressions were run where the dependent variable was a dummy for whether both ﬁrms in the market set the same price (above 55)
or not, and have the one-period lag of the dependent variable as the regressor. The estimated coefﬁcient on the regressor is always positive and signiﬁcant
in all of the duopoly treatments (all p-values < .05), for periods 1–40. Similar results occur for periods 21–40 (all p-values < .029), except for treatments
SNC2 and AAN2. These results are available in the Online Appendix.
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Table 4
Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon tests. p-Values for the test that the average Market Price, Same or Duration is the same across two treatments, for periods 1–40
(1–20) [21–40].
Treatment 1

Treatment 2

Average market price

Same

Duration

SNC2

SAN2
SCH2
SNC3
ANC2
SCH2
SAN3
SAN4
AAN2
SCH4
ACH2
SAN3
SAN4
SCH4
AAN2
ACH2
ACH2

.133 (.184) [.273]
<.001 (.008) [<.001]
.045 (.487) [.009]
.103 (.828) [.128]
.057 (.184) [.022]
.009 (.031) [.005]
.039 (.454) [.011]
.525 (.453) [.419]
.925 (>.999) [.758]
.564 (.817) [.231]
.916 (.674) [.529]
.699 (.366) [>.999]
.016 (.025) [.006]
.004 (.211) [.017]
<.001 (.002) [<.001]
<.001 (.008) [<.001]

.368 (.549) [.170]
<.001 (<.001) [<.001]
.015 (.213) [.014]
.225 (.955) [.095]
.008 (.015) [.002]
.002 (.373) [<.001]
.002 (.135) [.001]
.092 (.717) [.048]
.963 (.706) [.210]
.046 (.111) [.011]
.337 (.386) [.487]
.330 (.370) [.386]
.013 (.013) [.007]
.825 (.737) [.519]
.009 (.123) [.009]
.015 (.056) [.026]

.211 (.583) [.084]
<.001 (.002) [<.001]
.014 (.246) [.003]
.264 (.929) [.068]
.009 (.010) [.002]
.004 (.368) [<.001]
.003 (.148) [.001]
.114 (.925) [.047]
.510 (.851) [.071]
.022 (.147) [.005]
.143 (.333) [.535]
.411 (.411) [.386]
.013 (.013) [.007]
.657 (.346) [.414]
.008 (.093) [.005]
.015 (.032) [.025]

SAN2

SCH2
SNC3
SAN3
SAN4
ANC2
AAN2

SNC2 – symmetric, no communication, duopoly; SNC3 – symmetric, no communication, triopoly; SAN2 – symmetric, price announcement, duopoly; SAN3 –
symmetric, price announcement, triopoly; SCH2 – symmetric, chat, duopoly; SCH4 – symmetric, chat, quadropoly; ANC2 – asymmetric, no communication,
duopoly; AAN2 – asymmetric, price announcement, duopoly; ACH2 – asymmetric, chat, duopoly.
Bold values refer to p-values lower than 0.1.

Fig. 2. Mean and standard deviation of proﬁt – asymmetric duopoly (No Communication and Price Announcement treatments).

Of course, the lack of evidence for increased coordination in asymmetric duopolies may just reﬂect the inadequacy of
our measures. Same and Duration are designed to detect coordination on identical prices. Perhaps, due to cost differences,
asymmetric duopolies collude with different prices and choose maximal quantities so as to allocate market demand, or
instead alternate in supplying the entire market. If ﬁrms have settled down to such supracompetitive outcomes then this
will be reﬂected in high and stable industry proﬁt.
Figs. 2 and 3 report the mean and standard deviation of industry proﬁt over periods 21–40 for asymmetric and symmetric
duopolies, respectively, and for both the No Communication and Price Announcement treatments.17 Collusion is associated
with the northwest quadrant where industry proﬁt is high with low volatility. Examining Fig. 2, price announcements raise
average industry proﬁt for asymmetric duopolies but there are no observations of high and stable proﬁt (relative to when
ﬁrms are not permitted to make price announcements). In contrast, price announcements result in noticeably higher and
less variable proﬁt for one-third of the symmetric duopolies. For those four duopolies, industry proﬁt is higher and the
standard deviation is lower than in any of the 12 symmetric duopolies in the No Communication treatment. This evidence
is consistent with price announcements increasing the extent of collusion for symmetric duopolies but not for asymmetric
duopolies.18

17

The joint proﬁt maximum yields proﬁt of 3360, while industry proﬁt is 1056 when all ﬁrms set a price of 54.
These measures look at the mean and standard deviation for periods 21–40. A duopoly could succeed in colluding late in the horizon and thereby fail
to have a high stable proﬁt in this 20 period window. Inspection of the time series for all of the groups reveals only two such cases.
18
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Fig. 3. Mean and standard deviation of proﬁt – symmetric duopoly (No Communication and Price Announcement treatments).

Result 2. When ﬁrms can make price announcements then – compared to no communication – ﬁrms in a duopoly set
higher prices whether they are symmetric or asymmetric, but ﬁrms coordinate more only when they are symmetric. When
there are more than two ﬁrms, price announcements do not result in supracompetitive prices.
There is a rather natural explanation for why price announcements are more effective in producing collusion when
ﬁrms are symmetric. When sellers have identical cost functions, a symmetric supracompetitive outcome is focal, and can be
implemented by coordinating on identical prices. However, when sellers have different cost functions, a symmetric outcome
is no longer focal. An asymmetric outcome could be produced in a variety of ways but arguably the most straightforward
is for sellers to set identical prices and unequally allocate market demand, which is what has been done with many cartels
(Harrington, 2006). For example, if sellers wanted to support the joint proﬁt maximum and have the high cost seller receive
60% of market demand, both sellers could charge the monopoly price of 102, which yields market demand of 48, and have
the low cost seller set its maximal quantity equal to 19, which will result in the high cost seller supplying the residual
demand of 29. However, this collusive outcome requires coordination of prices and quantities. The difﬁculty in coordinating
on equal prices and unequal quantities in the Price Announcement treatment is that sellers are only allowed to announce
prices. Of course, just because an asymmetric outcome may be the most desirable collusive outcome for an asymmetric
duopoly, it does not imply that ﬁrms would try to coordinate on it. If it is perceived to be too difﬁcult then they could decide
to coordinate on identical prices and equally share market demand; some collusion is better than competition. However,
that is not what we are ﬁnding. Under asymmetric duopoly, sellers are not coordinating on a common price.
To complement the preceding nonparametric analysis, panel data regressions were conducted to measure the effect on
 + e , where p
market price of the communication protocols and cost structures. The empirical model is: pi,t = o + ˇXi,t
i,t
i,t
 are dummy variables for each treatment. Similar to previous studies, we
is the market price in group i in period t and Xi,t
allow for serial autocorrelation of the disturbance.19 The model was estimated for duopolies and for periods 1–20, 21–40,
and 1–40. In Table 5, DAnn is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the Price Announcement treatment (and value 0
for the No Communication treatment), DAsym is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the asymmetric cost treatment,
and we also have an interaction term for the communication and cost treatments.
Conﬁrming Result 2, the coefﬁcient on DAsym is negative (and signiﬁcant except for periods 1–20) indicating that, when
communication is prohibited, prices are lower when ﬁrms are asymmetric. Permitting ﬁrms to make price announcements
raises price by 10 for symmetric duopolies and 7.64 for asymmetric duopolies (using the estimated coefﬁcients for periods
21–40). While the negative coefﬁcient on the interaction term DAnn × DAsym is consistent with the claim that indirect
communication through price announcements is a more effective collusive device when ﬁrms are symmetric, it is not
signiﬁcant.
Let us now return to the issue of the high standard deviation for average market price for a symmetric duopoly under
the Price Announcement treatment (see Table 2). An inspection of the price paths for individual groups reveal that, under
symmetric duopoly, sellers either set high identical prices (5 out of 12 groups) or prices near competitive levels with some
unsuccessful forays into supracompetitive territory (5 out of 12 groups).20 It is this dichotomy in outcomes which we
believe is responsible for the high standard deviation: Either ﬁrms have great success in colluding or very little success. Such
a property is not found for the case of asymmetric duopoly. These claims are supported by Fig. 4 where an observation is a

19
20

See Mason et al. (1992), Mason and Phillips (1997), and Argenton and Müller (2012).
Price paths for all 12 groups are available in the Online Appendix.
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Table 5
Duopoly market price – no communication vs. price announcements.

Periods
Constant
DAnn
DAsym
DAnn × DAsym
F(3, 976)
F(3, 1956)
N

Regression 1
1–20

Regression 2
21–40

Regression 3
1–40

64.00***
(2.52)
8.93***
(3.46)
−4.04
(3.26)
−4.48
(4.27)

69.47***
(2.07)
10.00***
(3.20)
−6.46**
(2.67)
−2.36
(3.94)

66.74***
(1.66)
9.46***
(2.40)
−5.25**
(2.15)
−3.42
(2.97)

5.80***

10.59***

980

980

14.89***
1960

DAnn is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if ﬁrms can make price announcements and value 0 otherwise. DAsym is a dummy variable which takes
value 1 if ﬁrms cost functions are asymmetric and value 0 otherwise. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *p-Value <.10.
**
p-Value <.05.
***
p-Value <.01.

Fig. 4. Average market price and coordination (same), price announcement: symmetric and asymmetric duopolies.

group’s average market price and the number of periods for which ﬁrms set the same price. When ﬁrms are symmetric, the
observations form two (circled) clumps; one with low price and low coordination, and the other with high price and high
coordination (with the exception of one group with high price and low coordination). Note that the lowest average price for
the groups in the “high Same” clump exceeds the highest average price for the groups in the “low Same” clump. Also, 5 out
of the 12 symmetric duopoly groups have average price close to the monopoly price of 102. When ﬁrms are asymmetric,
there is no apparent relationship between average price and the frequency with which ﬁrms set the same price.
Summarizing this section, the ability to make non-binding price announcements produces more collusion – as reﬂected
in stable supracompetitive outcomes – only for symmetric duopolies. For symmetric duopolies, if price announcements are
able to produce collusion then the collusion is often near-maximal in that sellers consistently set prices near the monopoly
level. While price announcements do raise average prices for asymmetric duopolies, there is little evidence that sellers are
coordinating; they do not set common prices, and an examination of proﬁt does not support coordination on an asymmetric
outcome.

4.3. Express communication: Chat
Turning to the Chat treatment, collusion is rampant; sellers set high and identical prices most of the time and in almost
all groups. From Table 2 for the symmetric case, average price is 91.2 over periods 1–40 (which is 77% of the gap between
the competitive and monopoly prices) and is 98.9 over periods 21–40 (93% of the gap). Even more impressive, the median
price is the monopoly price of 102 (periods 21–40). Prices are just as high when the duopoly has asymmetric ﬁrms with an
average price of 91.2 for periods 1–40 and an average price of 99.5 for periods 21–40. Finally, when there are more than two
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Table 6
Asymmetric duopoly with chat (periods 21–40).
Group

Average
market price

Median market
price

Number of
periods with
equal price

Firm 1 (low cost)
Average proﬁt

Firm 2 (high cost)
Average proﬁt

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

102.0
144.5
100.9
95.6
102.7
84.4
98.0
99.0
102.0
96.4
68.6
100.6

102.0
145.0
102.0
95.0
103.0
84.4
101.0
102.0
102.0
102.0
64.5
99.0

20
1
16
4
18
0
17
18
20
1
1
16

1944
335
1629
1148
1753
1440
1603
1904
1944
1428
1057
1795

1416
304
1601
1654
1523
1440
1640
1287
1416
1186
555
1451

Firm 1 (low cost)
Average market
share
50 %
53 %
41 %
35 %
45 %
30 %
38 %
50 %
50 %
54 %
56 %
47 %

Table 7
Duopoly market price – price announcements vs. chat.

Periods
Constant
DChat
DAsym
DChat × DAsym
F(3, 949)
F(3, 955)
F(3, 1908)
N

Regression 1
1–20

Regression 2
21–40

Regression 3
1–40

72.93***
(2.37)
10.38***
(3.83)
−8.51***
(2.76)
7.85
(4.91)

79.47***
(2.45)
19.43***
(2.68)
−8.83***
(2.90)
9.28***
(3.60)

76.20***
(1.74)
14.97***
(2.43)
−8.67***
(2.04)
8.53***
(3.19)

19.05***
88.98***
953

959

69.72***
1912

DChat is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if ﬁrms can chat and value 0 otherwise. DAsym is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if ﬁrms cost
functions are asymmetric and value 0 otherwise. Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. *p-Value <.10, **p-Value <.05.
***
p-Value <.01.

sellers, chat is producing near-monopoly prices, while prices are close to competitive levels when sellers could only make
price announcements.21,22
We previously noted that, when sellers are symmetric, coordination is higher with price announcements compared to
when there is no communication, and we ﬁnd that they are yet higher when sellers can chat. From Table 3, the percentage
of periods for which symmetric sellers set the same price (during periods 21–40) is 18% with no communication, almost
50% with price announcements, and more than 90% with chat. Furthermore, there was near-perfect collusion in 11 of the 12
groups as ﬁrms charged identical prices starting in period 27 (or earlier) and the average market price was between 97 and
102. When sellers are asymmetric, the percentage of periods for which sellers set the same price (during periods 21–40) is
9–15% with either no communication or price announcements and rises to almost 55% with chat.
However, that measure understates the extent of collusion because some groups coordinated on different prices. Table 6
reports summary statistics for the 12 asymmetric groups with chat (for periods 21–40). Seven groups coordinated on identical
prices near the monopoly level and another three groups coordinated on different prices (as revealed by inspecting the price
and quantity paths). Sellers in group 2 alternated between a price just above 145 and a price of 145 so they took turns selling
at 145 (which actually resulted in low proﬁt because price was too high). Group 6 settled down to a stationary outcome in
which the low cost seller prices at 90 and the high cost seller prices at 82 and limits its supply to 42 so that the low cost seller
has residual demand of 18. This outcome allowed them to earn the same high proﬁt. Finally, sellers in group 10 alternated
between a price of 102 and not posting a price so that each earned monopoly proﬁt every other period.23

21
In Table 2, prices for four symmetric sellers in the Chat treatment far exceed the prices for three symmetric sellers in the Price Announcements
treatment.
22
With regards to the earlier expressed concern that the experimental setting may be too complex, subjects’ behavior does not support that concern.
As just noted for the Chat treatment, the median price is at or very close to the monopoly price which indicates that they have solved the joint proﬁt
maximization problem. For the No Communication treatment, results are consistent with previous experiments in that market price for two subjects
exceeds the static Nash equilibrium price, while market price for three or more subjects is close to the static Nash equilibrium price.
23
Group 4 also had a high average market price but their conduct did not settle down to any recognizable pattern.
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Result 3. When sellers can engage in chat then – compared to either no communication or price announcements – sellers
set higher prices and coordinate more, whether they are symmetric or asymmetric and whether there are two sellers or
more than two sellers. With chat, prices are often at or near monopoly levels.
Table 7 reports estimates from panel data regressions which allow us to compare the efﬁcacy of communicating through
chat with non-binding price announcements. Express communication signiﬁcantly raises price. When ﬁrms are symmetric,
price is higher by 19.43 and, when ﬁrms are asymmetric, the price increase is 28.71 (using the estimated coefﬁcients for
periods 21–40). The positive coefﬁcient for the interaction term supports the claim that direct communication through chat
is a more effective collusive device when ﬁrms are asymmetric, compared to price announcements. Thus, the incremental
value to directly, as opposed to indirectly, communicating, is greater when ﬁrms have different cost functions.
Result 4. For the case of duopoly, the incremental effect on price of chat compared to price announcements is greater when
ﬁrms are asymmetric than when they are symmetric.

5. Concluding remarks
The primary objectives of this project are to investigate: (1) the efﬁcacy of non-binding price announcements in producing
collusion; (2) the efﬁcacy of unrestricted communication relative to price announcements in producing collusion, and (3)
how the answers to those ﬁrst two questions depend on market structure in terms of ﬁrm asymmetries and the number of
ﬁrms. One main ﬁnding is that price announcements clearly increase the frequency of collusion for a symmetric duopoly but
do not facilitate collusion when ﬁrms are asymmetric or there are more than two ﬁrms. The near-universal experimental
ﬁnding that it is very difﬁcult for three or more ﬁrms to coordinate on high prices when there is no communication is
shown to be robust to allowing ﬁrms to communicate through price announcements. Though price announcements do raise
average price with asymmetric duopolies, there is little evidence that they are able to generate stable supracompetitive
outcomes. Regarding the efﬁcacy of unrestricted communication, it is highly effective in producing collusion whether ﬁrms
are identical or not and regardless of the number of ﬁrms. For all cases, prices and proﬁts are signiﬁcantly higher when
sellers can engage in express communication compared to when only price announcements are available. The incremental
gain of direct communication (through chat) compared to indirect communication (through price announcements) is large
for all market structures but especially when ﬁrms are asymmetric and when there are more than two ﬁrms.
Our experimental evidence is consistent with the following two hypotheses. First, indirect communication through price
announcements is sufﬁcient for producing collusion in symmetric duopolies. Second, reasonably direct communication is
required to produce collusion when ﬁrms are asymmetric or there are more than two ﬁrms. The evidence for that hypothesis
is that collusion was widely observed when ﬁrms engage in online chat, while price announcements rarely resulted in
collusion when there were more than two ﬁrms or ﬁrms had different cost functions. Of course, there are other forms of
indirect communication which may succeed where price announcements failed. Also, while price announcements produced
little collusion for asymmetric duopolies, higher prices were observed which may indicate failed attempts at colluding.
Perhaps the addition of quantity announcements would be sufﬁcient to result in collusion in that case, or allowing ﬁrms
to announce strategies. At the same time, the asymmetry in our experiment is very mild so it is rather striking that price
announcements are insufﬁcient for coordination. In actual markets, ﬁrms are substantively asymmetric, yet it seems that
price announcements have worked; for example, in the airlines industry. There is then a gap between what is being found
experimentally and what has occurred in actual markets.
In terms of future research, there is more to be done in allowing for different ﬁrm asymmetries and communication
protocols. The cost asymmetry could be made more extensive by assuming it applies to all units. Other forms of asymmetry
to consider are capacity and product differentiation. It is especially important to investigate other types of non-express
means of communication such as the announcement by a seller of a strategy. Such messages were the basis for at least
two Section 5 “invitation to collude” cases pursued by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in recent years.24 Finally, some
experiments have allowed for probabilistic penalties in response to sellers choosing to engage in online chat, in order to
simulate the penalties imposed by antitrust and competition law. Our design could be modiﬁed to make online chat an
option. Sellers could then seek to “legally” collude through price announcements or “illegally” collude through online chat.
This design would serve to identify the types of market structures for which sellers opt for express communication.

Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.014.

24
In the Matter of Valassis Communications, Inc., File No. 051 0008, Docket No. C-4160, April 28, 2006; and U-Haul International, Inc. Docket No. C-4294
Complaint, July 14, 2010.
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